„Delirant Reges, plectunur Achivi” – The people pay for the foolishness of the kings
How King Matthias Corvinus was reinforcing his power and how the people paid for his foreign wars…
King Matthias was born in Transylvania, in Kolozsvár (Cluj, Klausenburg) in 1443 and his family had great lands there. No wonder he wanted to take the reins of Transylvania into his strong hands, knowing how important part it was of the kingdom.
How did Zrínyi Miklós (Nikola Zrinski) write about it some 200 years later? At the same time, see how Zrínyi criticized King Matthias for making war against the Bohemian king under the excuse of religion; he explains his thoughts about religious wars in more detail.
You can read about the beginning of King Matthias’ reign here:
https://www.hungarianottomanwars.com/essays/the-beginning-of-king-matthias-reign/
Read Zrínyi’s thoughts and let’s pose the question of why these things could be timely at his age:
“Next, Transylvania and Moldova have rebelled, daring to kick against the luck of the king. Transylvania protested about the size of its tax but it was not a just cause. For the king was in need of the tax, especially a king like Mathias had been…The people have no peace without an army but there is no army without getting paid and there is no payment without taxes. (…) We can observe the quickness and the diligence of the king: he did not leave time for spreading the plot against him: he reacted at once.”
"The second observation is that this king was that he was masterfully able to carry out something in more than one way. (…) Moldova could not have been tamed without a weapon so he punished it with the weapon. Transylvania has admitted its fault so the king had mercy on it but cast some of the noblemen out of the country. Some of these have not left the country by the given time, trusting in the leniency of the king. The king gave them to the hand of the executioner so the rest could learn not to play anymore with the mercy and the law of the king. Alike, there is no greater sin before God than daringly insisting on God`s mercy.”
“The third observation is that the king was bustling to fight against the Moldovians; while other kings would have run away immediately from there, he was bravely waiting for his enemy and even defeated it, though he got wounded himself one cannot avoid getting wounded because „virtus vulnere viret” – the brave is decorated by wounds.”
The background of the Hungarian-Bohemian relations:
On the death of King László V, the young Matthias was taken into the custody of Podjebrád in Prague, who, in exchange for his release, promised the boy, who was not yet 15, that he would later marry his daughter, Catherine, then nine years old. As it was still in the interest of Matthias to strengthen this relationship, the marriage took place on 1 May 1463, but Catherine died in childbirth in the spring of 1464, at the age of 15.
The already existing conflicts of interest between the Bohemian and Hungarian sides were then further exacerbated. The Czech king did not sufficiently support Matthias against the Czech mercenaries in the Highlands and against Emperor Frederick III. At the same time, the Pope, despite his conversion, considered the Czech king a Hussite and worked to overthrow him. In 1465, Matthias had already indicated his willingness to fight both the Bohemians and the Turks in exchange for papal support.
In the spring of 1468, the son of the Czech king, Podjebrád Viktorin, the Moravian captain-general, launched an attack against Emperor Frederick III. The Emperor asked his adopted son, King Matthias, for help. Antonio Bonfini put it this way: “The Hungarian king was also in a difficult domestic political situation, which is why he decided to go to war.” These were the words of King Matthias in his declaration of war against Podjebrád on 25 April 1468:
“You have declared war against our father, the Roman Emperor, though you know well that we have a treaty with him which obliges us to give him aid. And while you have attacked our friends without sufficient cause, you have also long since provoked us to many injuries and offenses. These our love of peace has hitherto borne with patience; but now we must seek in our arms the assurance of peace, which we can no longer find in your words and characters.”
The Hungarian monarch was ostensibly complying with the wishes of the Pope and the Emperor, but in reality, he undertook a protracted and unsuccessful war against his former father-in-law for the Bohemian throne and to prevent the expansion of the Jagellos.
However, Matthias misjudged the situation. From then on, the Bohemian War tied up the country’s forces for a decade, and the king received almost none of the money promised by Frederick III for this purpose. The anti-Pojebrád Czech Catholic noblemen league was weaker than expected, and the Czech royal army, then considered the best soldiers in Europe, was stronger than expected.
On the other hand, the Bohemian war also had a positive effect on the country: Matthias was able to employ his mercenaries (who were also largely Czechs), and wars at this time could sustain themselves and the armies involved to a certain extent, as they lived largely on plunder. Winning battles and sieges also provided income for the barons through their bands. Militarily, the war produced mixed results.
In May 1468, Matthias took Třebíč in Moravia but was himself wounded. In February 1469, at the siege of Chrudim, the king went on a reconnaissance in disguise, according to tradition, and was captured but released because of his disguise. It was here that the legend of the king in disguise, which later became so widespread, first appeared. It is a fact, however, that at Vilémov the Bohemian king’s troops surrounded Matthias’ forces. The Hungarian monarch then requested a meeting with Podjebrád, which was held in a hut, a truce was agreed and another meeting was arranged at Olomouc.
Podjebrád, as Electoral Prince of the German Empire, agreed to support Matthias in his election as King of Rome, as already promised by the Pope and the Emperor, which was a stepping stone for Matthias to gain the title of German-Roman Emperor. In return, Matthias agreed to reconcile his former father-in-law with the Vatican. Both sides were taking an impossible step because Emperor Frederick III had already given the title of King of Rome to Charles the Bold, Prince of Burgundy, and the Pope was in no way prepared to make any concessions to the Hussite king. In any case, Matthias was thus able to escape from his tight military situation.
On 3 May 1469, the Catholic Czech orders elected Matthias King of Bohemia in the cathedral of Olomouc. This left the country with two kings, and the possibility of an agreement between the two was abolished. In addition to the Czech Catholic orders, Matthias was accepted as king by the Catholic tributary provinces of Moravia, Silesia, and Lausitz, as well as by the mainly German-speaking towns (especially Wroclaw / Breslau / Boroszló). The fronts were stiffened.
In March 1471, King George Podjebrád of Bohemia died, but the Bohemian orders did not choose Matthias, who already held the title of King of Bohemia, but the eldest son of the Polish King Casimir IV, the then 15-year-old Polish King Ulászló Jagelló, to replace him.
In the wake of this failure, and largely because of the heavy domestic tax burden caused by the Bohemian War, a rebellion led by Vitéz János broke out against Matthias. In the new situation, with Bohemia having a devout Catholic ruler instead of the Hussite Podjebrád, Matthias’s Czech war lost all legitimacy, although, on 28 May 1471, the papal legate Lorenzo Roverella in Jihlava confirmed Matthias as King of Bohemia. You can read more about the war of Matthias in Boroszló / Wroclaw:
https://www.hungarianottomanwars.com/essays/king-matthias-at-boroszlo-wroclaw-breslau/
In 1477, under the terms of the Treaty of Gmunden-Korneuburg, Emperor Frederick also recognized Matthias as King of Bohemia and took the traditional oath of allegiance to him. Afterward, both Ulászló and Matthias resumed negotiations, and in 1478 they concluded the Peace of Olomouc, which was solemnly ratified on 21 July 1479. This confirmed the status quo, under which they mutually recognized each other’s titles as Czech kings, with Matthias retaining Moravia, Silesia, and Lausitz, and Bohemia in the narrower sense of the term remaining in Ulászló’s hands. Under the terms of the peace, Ulászló could only redeem his territories after Matthias’ death for 400,000 gold Florins.
Ulászló remained the Electoral Prince, but Matthias also took the first step towards obtaining it. However, keeping the army abroad was both an advantage and a disadvantage. The pay itself resulted in a large outflow of gold, but its “supplement” (plunder and looting) did not destroy Hungary.
Regarding the Bohemian War in 1468, Zrínyi wrote the next:
“Then, Matthias’ army attacked the Bohemian king; it was because of the instigation of the Pope of Rome and the Emperor of Rome and the pretext was the religion of this war. I do not know how we must praise this campaign: it was not righteous but it was rather necessary.
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Source: Partly from Hungarian Wikipedia
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